{
  "available": true,
  "commandStatus": "fail",
  "generatedAt": "2026-11-07T12:13:10.237Z",
  "rules": [
    {
      "id": "trust-01",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "trust-01 system: PGlite context and writes cannot cross teammates in one account",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "control memory retains teammate isolation in the canonical RLS repository",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: event throttling, durable duplicate keys and fenced event payloads",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "templates: name-and-job blank conversation, connected Inbox backfill and metadata event produce proactive messages",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "1Password: selected-vault metadata projection cannot expose fields, foreign vaults or website query secrets",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-01/11 (browser): teammate profiles cannot be borrowed and destruction removes the entire disk",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-01: context and memory are scoped to one teammate",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-01/trust-02: fresh importer identities and memory stay in their host account and teammate",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Chief accepts only addressed structured status, rejecting context, instructions and approvals",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-02",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "control memory retains teammate isolation in the canonical RLS repository",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "billing: a signed webhook cannot bind another account, and retries grant a plan once",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "billing: forged, replay-window and live webhooks are rejected before a plan or gateway share can change",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "billing: referral grants both accounts one month, rejects self and duplicate rewards, and protects expiring shares",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "billing: only 1,000 founding reservations, stable Checkout retries, expiry and lifetime pricing",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "app: authenticated transport, account-scoped ledger, CSRF decisions and durable Undo through real Control routes",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-04: control rejects superuser and BYPASSRLS roles",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-02: routes cannot read or change another account",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "verified identity provisions one personal account",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "WebSocket updates are scoped to the signed-in account",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: authenticated routes, RLS and composite ownership exclude foreign routines",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "1Password: selected-vault metadata projection cannot expose fields, foreign vaults or website query secrets",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-01/trust-02: fresh importer identities and memory stay in their host account and teammate",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-05: create ignores supplied IDs including deleted IDs",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-11: high-risk auto still asks and foreign principals cannot execute",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-12: unsafe legacy repository and schema are absent",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-03",
      "status": "pending",
      "system": {
        "status": "pending",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "trust-03 + trust-11 + no-direct-internet: real DockerRunner, vault, live heap, Chromium proxy-only and profile deletion on Docker host",
            "status": "not-run"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "1Password: selected-vault metadata projection cannot expose fields, foreign vaults or website query secrets",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: method, path and grant policies deny cross-service, token endpoint and off-origin access before transport",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: only handles enter auth headers, fetched instructions remain fenced, next-call revocation is live",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook proxy admits pinned MIME replies with header-only credentials and refuses ungranted bodies and revoked connections",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: mail/model approval arguments cannot authorise credential use or select a field",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: revocation/takeover while app approval is open prevents resolution and fill",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: ungranted destination fails before approval, vault policy checks before resolving",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: each use needs a fresh app approval and returns no sink or SDK secret",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: resolving is single-use, live-gated and invalid after the fill callback returns",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03/05/12 (browser): credential, code, card and challenge pages request human input, never model-readable approvals or values",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03: encrypted at rest and substituted only at the host boundary",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 / trust-08 (Google refresh): both tokens stay encrypted and only a handle returns",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V01-header-only: stored Calendar and Gmail data cannot contain injected secrets",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V02-refresh-private: token exchanges are vault-only and token endpoints are not egress",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V03-host-routes: direct sends, draft sends and deletes cannot bypass runTool",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V04-host-bound: unsubscribe hosts never receive Google credentials",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V08-reflections: encoded and split credential reflections are withheld",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V11-real-chain: runTool to real Gmail connector to real proxy enforces approvals and next-call revocation",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 (Gmail boundary): Google receives only a vault handle via the injected proxy",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 (Gmail egress): redirects and off-provider URLs cannot carry handles",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 (unsubscribe boundary): an ungranted mail-header host is never contacted",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 (Calendar boundary): only a vault handle reaches the injected Google proxy",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 (Calendar egress): off-provider calls fail before fetching",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03: importer refuses credential fields and discards connection transports",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 boundary: OSS export rejects unreviewed files, secrets, URLs and symlinks without copying private history",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-04",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "V12-errors: unbilled provider errors cost zero; reported usage is charged exactly",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V12-stream: admission timeout is cleared when provider streaming starts",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-04: every model call is attributed and counted before send, then ledgered, including abort",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "routines: proactive cron, restart deduplication and last-five audit/ledger estimates in share terms",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: parallel workers and messages share one durable teammate execution lease",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-05",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "templates: name-and-job blank conversation, connected Inbox backfill and metadata event produce proactive messages",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-02-outbox: completed action survives receipt failure and replays exactly once",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-06: approved actions expire and bind to the exact live connection",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-09: undo uses live runTool gates and executes outside transactions",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-09-outbox: undo completion and evidence recover after a follow-up write failure",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-09-approval: an Ask undo resumes once after a human decision and denial releases its claim",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "two successful undos demote the class and evidence persists",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: takeover, revocation and in-app approval gates apply to scheduled tool calls",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "core-11: high-risk auto still asks and foreign principals cannot execute",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: method, path and grant policies deny cross-service, token endpoint and off-origin access before transport",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook proxy admits pinned MIME replies with header-only credentials and refuses ungranted bodies and revoked connections",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: mail/model approval arguments cannot authorise credential use or select a field",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: revocation/takeover while app approval is open prevents resolution and fill",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: ungranted destination fails before approval, vault policy checks before resolving",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03/05/12 (browser): credential, code, card and challenge pages request human input, never model-readable approvals or values",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V03-host-routes: direct sends, draft sends and deletes cannot bypass runTool",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V11-real-chain: runTool to real Gmail connector to real proxy enforces approvals and next-call revocation",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: queued send rechecks original arguments and blocks revoke/takeover without retry",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook security regression: atomic reply MIME has exactly the original sender and no editable intermediate draft",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: generic filing cannot become deletion by targeting Deleted Items",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook calendar: gate denial prevents irreversible cancellation I/O",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Connectors: stable model profile counts all connected tools and cannot expose hidden undo or exceed twelve",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password security regression: malformed truthy approvals and biometric results fail closed",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05/08 (browser): live admission revocation prevents the next tool and no navigation is sent",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05: off, ask, first week and high risk do not execute",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "undo-send: runtime receipt cancels the connector queue ID before delivery",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "undo-label: runtime receipt restores the previous label set",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "undo-calendar-update: runtime receipt restores previous fields and the returned ETag",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "undo-calendar-create: dedicated reversible cancellation cannot delete an unrelated event",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V06-reply-from: automatic replies use exactly one original From, never a changed Reply-To",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V07-unsubscribe-mail: fixed content and one recipient prevent mail-authored sends",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V10-custom-labels: file cannot mutate any Gmail system label",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05 / trust-10 (Gmail boundary): the trusted gate sees exact arguments at call and dispatch",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05 / trust-10 (Calendar boundary): delete is irreversible and cannot bypass the gate",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Inbox golden transcripts: ten synthetic bills and ten metadata triage cases pass with no sends or payments",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05/trust-06: imports cannot activate routines, add executable paths or change autonomy",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "new template defaults keep Bills sends/payments Off and purchases/bookings Ask",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-06",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "routines: event throttling, durable duplicate keys and fenced event payloads",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "1Password: selected-vault metadata projection cannot expose fields, foreign vaults or website query secrets",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: only handles enter auth headers, fetched instructions remain fenced, next-call revocation is live",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V06-reply-from: automatic replies use exactly one original From, never a changed Reply-To",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V07-unsubscribe-mail: fixed content and one recipient prevent mail-authored sends",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Inbox golden transcripts: ten synthetic bills and ten metadata triage cases pass with no sends or payments",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05/trust-06: imports cannot activate routines, add executable paths or change autonomy",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06 (browser): malicious page instructions and closing delimiters remain fenced data; blocked proxy has no direct fallback",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06: every tool result is fenced and cannot escape its envelope",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-03: all event payloads are escaped inside the tool-result fence",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V13-presort: classified mail never reaches search or watch model context",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06 (Gmail boundary): instruction-like mail remains untrusted data",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06 (Calendar boundary): event content is fenced as untrusted data",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06/trust-12: imported text cannot confirm itself or become policy",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06: imported memories and role text cannot close the review fence",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06 boundary: failed suite collection and builds cannot leave a successful publication status",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06 boundary: publication separates fencing, missing system evidence and measured model trials",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "avatar upload boundary rejects active content and remote bodies without network access",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Chief accepts only addressed structured status, rejecting context, instructions and approvals",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "every new template ships injection goldens with forbidden action assertions",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "fencing": {
        "status": "pass"
      },
      "redTeam": {
        "status": "not-yet-measured",
        "label": "not yet measured",
        "reason": "No eval report was supplied."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-07",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "billing: a signed webhook cannot bind another account, and retries grant a plan once",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-04: control rejects superuser and BYPASSRLS roles",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: authenticated routes, RLS and composite ownership exclude foreign routines",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-07: a non-owner cannot reach account routes",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pending",
        "proofs": []
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-08",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "core-06: approved actions expire and bind to the exact live connection",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-09: undo uses live runTool gates and executes outside transactions",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: takeover, revocation and in-app approval gates apply to scheduled tool calls",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "Outlook: only handles enter auth headers, fetched instructions remain fenced, next-call revocation is live",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook proxy admits pinned MIME replies with header-only credentials and refuses ungranted bodies and revoked connections",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: revocation/takeover while app approval is open prevents resolution and fill",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: resolving is single-use, live-gated and invalid after the fill callback returns",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03 / trust-08 (Google refresh): both tokens stay encrypted and only a handle returns",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V11-real-chain: runTool to real Gmail connector to real proxy enforces approvals and next-call revocation",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: queued send rechecks original arguments and blocks revoke/takeover without retry",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05/08 (browser): live admission revocation prevents the next tool and no navigation is sent",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-08: revocation and denied hosts are checked on the next request and audited",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V09-separate-grants: Calendar cannot reach Gmail or reuse its revoked credential",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-08 (Gmail boundary): proxy revocation is consulted afresh on the next call",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-08 (Calendar boundary): revoked proxy access fails on the next call",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-09",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "billing: forged, replay-window and live webhooks are rejected before a plan or gateway share can change",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "billing: referral grants both accounts one month, rejects self and duplicate rewards, and protects expiring shares",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "billing: only 1,000 founding reservations, stable Checkout retries, expiry and lifetime pricing",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "app: authenticated transport, account-scoped ledger, CSRF decisions and durable Undo through real Control routes",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "V12-errors: unbilled provider errors cost zero; reported usage is charged exactly",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "billing: a downgrade preserves every share and usage until the calendar reset, then syncs the gateway",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-09: concurrent calls cannot spend the same share; in-flight estimates and settled usage both count",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "routines: proactive cron, restart deduplication and last-five audit/ledger estimates in share terms",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-10",
      "status": "fail",
      "system": {
        "status": "fail",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "core-09: undo uses live runTool gates and executes outside transactions",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: takeover, revocation and in-app approval gates apply to scheduled tool calls",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-02: provider execution holds no transaction and control changes never wait",
            "status": "fail"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-02-lease: hung provider times out, aborts and cannot replay an uncertain action",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-08: ending takeover restores paused and suspended states",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "take-over completes during an in-flight tool and prevents the next call",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: uncertain runs are not replayed and paused cron backlogs keep only the latest slot",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "1Password: revocation/takeover while app approval is open prevents resolution and fill",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: resolving is single-use, live-gated and invalid after the fill callback returns",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: parallel workers and messages share one durable teammate execution lease",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook: queued send rechecks original arguments and blocks revoke/takeover without retry",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook calendar: gate denial prevents irreversible cancellation I/O",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05 / trust-10 (Gmail boundary): the trusted gate sees exact arguments at call and dispatch",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-05 / trust-10 (Calendar boundary): delete is irreversible and cannot bypass the gate",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-10 (browser): all model tools refuse while human input owns the browser",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-10: takeover stops a previously built context",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-01: step stops before models, memory and speech on takeover, pause or suspension",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-11",
      "status": "pending",
      "system": {
        "status": "pending",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "trust-03 + trust-11 + no-direct-internet: real DockerRunner, vault, live heap, Chromium proxy-only and profile deletion on Docker host",
            "status": "not-run"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "trust-01/11 (browser): teammate profiles cannot be borrowed and destruction removes the entire disk",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-05: create ignores supplied IDs including deleted IDs",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-10: deletion anonymises audits and preserves account decision history",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-11 (runner boundary): destruction removes container, scoped proxy, volume and network",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "failed destruction remains queued for an idempotent retry",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-11: delete cascades teammate records and destroys its runner",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: deleting a teammate cascades run jobs, event keys and routine audit data",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "trust-12",
      "status": "pass",
      "system": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "app: authenticated transport, account-scoped ledger, CSRF decisions and durable Undo through real Control routes",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-06: approved actions expire and bind to the exact live connection",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-09-approval: an Ask undo resumes once after a human decision and denial releases its claim",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "routines: takeover, revocation and in-app approval gates apply to scheduled tool calls",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "phone push: real browser service worker opens authenticated Control, never decides until the human taps, and exposes no approval token",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Google callback establishes a revocable signed session and rejects CSRF",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "expired approval is a readable receipt and cannot resume",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-12: mail and model content cannot decide or bypass an approval",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "authenticated approval resumes its saved call once",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "integrated conversation suspends and resumes after the member decision",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      },
      "boundary": {
        "status": "pass",
        "proofs": [
          {
            "name": "1Password: mail/model approval arguments cannot authorise credential use or select a field",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: each use needs a fresh app approval and returns no sink or SDK secret",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-03/05/12 (browser): credential, code, card and challenge pages request human input, never model-readable approvals or values",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Outlook security regression: atomic reply MIME has exactly the original sender and no editable intermediate draft",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password security regression: malformed truthy approvals and biometric results fail closed",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "trust-06/trust-12: imported text cannot confirm itself or become policy",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-10: deletion anonymises audits and preserves account decision history",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "1Password: device biometric success cannot replace an authenticated app approval",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "core-07: approval events never reach the model",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "Chief accepts only addressed structured status, rejecting context, instructions and approvals",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "new template defaults keep Bills sends/payments Off and purchases/bookings Ask",
            "status": "pass"
          },
          {
            "name": "every new template ships injection goldens with forbidden action assertions",
            "status": "pass"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  ]
}